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Introduction
From the time that the London Mis-
sionary Society first took Zimbabwean
rainfall records at Hope Fountain in 1888, the worst
droughts on record are the consecutive dry spells
from 1911 to 1914, the 1946–47 drought, the 1960
drought, and the 1972–73 rainy season, which was
the driest period of colonial Zimbabwe. The coun-
try also had serious food shortages in 1903, 1916,
1922, 1933, and 1942. Although the people of pre-
colonial Zimbabwe experienced recurrent droughts,
they generally had well-developed coping mecha-
nisms that prevented high death tolls (Iliffe, 1990).
The Good Neighbor
Zimbabwe’s rainfall pattern has al-
ways been one of greater precipitation
in the northern parts of the country, with gradually
diminishing rains from north to south. This has
meant that in any given year there is never a “total”
rainfall failure and therefore a “total” crop failure.
Scarcity in most cases has been localized, and local
food shortages in pre-colonial Zimbabwe therefore
rarely degenerated into famines that killed.
The tradition of sharing among the peoples of
pre-colonial Zimbabwe was one of the pillars of
famine prevention strategies that had its roots in the
ethics of the peoples’ culture. No one was allowed
to die when someone else had a surplus of food.
There was a well-established barter trade system, in
the form of either in-kind or exchange of food for
labor. Only those who were unable to exchange
either of the two resorted to begging. Even in this
begging, the beggar provided some form of service
(for example, entertainment) in exchange for food.
Agriculture and Food Gathering
Major settlements in pre-colonial Zim-
babwe were centered on the high rain-
fall belt in the highveld at the center of modern
Zimbabwe. This region is known for its agricultur-
ally rich soils and abundant natural resources, in-
cluding game and other wild sources of food. The
people had relatively well-developed agricultural
skills. They grew drought-resistant crops, mainly
finger millet and bulrush millet.
During times of plenty, some of the surplus was
stored in secluded natural silos (often caves), as a
strategic reserve during wartime. These reserves
could also be used during a famine. In addition,
traditional leaders like the king and at times the
chief always kept strategic reserves for their people
in case of famine. This is best captured by Shona
praise poetry at the accession of a chief:
You are the chief of everyone,




They are to cook for the hungry, serve those
who wait for food.
(Hodza and Fortune, 1979)
Perhaps the greatest asset that the people had
was the overabundance of wild foods. Early Euro-
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pean explorers who came noted that “starvation was
impossible in the Zambezi Valley” (Scudder, 1971).
Colonial Invasion
The establishment of colonial rule in
the 1890s coincided with severe food
shortages. The causes of the shortages included
drought, locust invasions, and the animal disease
rinderpest, which decimated cattle herds, especially
in Matabeleland. The situation was made worse by
the civil conflict that followed the invasion of
Matabeleland by Europeans. Spiritual leaders had
warned of the impending famine if the “whites were
not driven off.” Food shortages were quite acute in
1896, when people died from famine because of the
combination of natural phenomena and the rebel-
lion against colonial domination.
To create dependency and ensure the accep-
tance of their rule, the invading Europeans de-
stroyed most of the grain the people had stored. The
period 1895–97 was disastrous. The combined ef-
fects of the Shona and Ndebele rebellions of 1896
and 1897, the plunder and destruction of grain by
European troops, and the invasion of locusts and
rinderpest disease all hurt food security. The British
South African Company (BSAP) reported wide-
spread starvation throughout the country during the
peak of the rebellion in 1897.
Food Handouts Introduced
Indeed, the people succumbed to the
power of the Europeans and, in Octo-
ber 1896, the first-ever food distribution center was
set up in Bulawayo by the BSAP. This center
distributed food to some 3,000 people every day.
The establishment of the Bulawayo Food Distri-
bution Centre became a turning point in the history
of food production in the country. By 1903, the
colonial administration had set up 16 “Native Re-
serves” in Matabeleland and 80 “Native Reserves”
in Mashonaland. Africans who still occupied what
was now “European land” were forced to pay taxes
by colonial authorities who wanted to force them
into the reserves. However, despite having their
land usurped, African farmers produced more grain
than the Europeans. The Rhodesia Herald of Sep-
tember 19, 1903, commented, “It is hardly a bright
reflection on the state of (European) agriculture to
note that so soon as the Kafir trade in this commod-
ity fails, customers have to take the imported ar-
ticle.”
Another famine occurred in 1903. The colonial
authorities’ famine policy then rested on two prin-
ciples. One was to rely wherever possible on private
trade. The second principle was that men should
earn money to buy food by migrating to wage
employment on white farms and in urban areas.
The call to wage labor was received with little
enthusiasm, especially in Mashonaland and the
Zambezi Valley, as most men shunned the mines
and labor camps. This response surprised the Euro-
peans. It also illustrates the fact that famine survival
during the 1903 drought owed little to government
aid or the European economy. The people survived
the famine by traditional means, especially by ex-
ploiting wild food. As long as wild food was avail-
able, men would stay at home, eat forest products,
and sustain their families. This traditional practice
was so strong that many communities had no idea
that there was a government relief operation.
This resistance to food handouts was also evi-
dent during the 1912 famine, when people in the
Masvingo District “refused absolutely to accept any
advance of grain or meal either from private indi-
viduals or from the government,” as Native Com-
missioner Bazeley reported in May 1912.
Furthermore, the authorities’ fear of African
pauperization clashed with African expectations of
reciprocity. The starving Africans got the famine
relief food at famine prices, yet they had to repay
the food during normal times. The authorities of
Southern Rhodesia had no famine disaster code at
that time but had a “tradition of expecting starving
Africans to work, encouraging private trade, giving
some help with transport, and confining direct relief
to the incapacitated” (Peires, 1982). This thinking
was to be the “official policy” adopted by Southern
Rhodesia administrator Sir William Henry Milton
during the 1912 famine.
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This policy persisted even up to the 1916 fam-
ine. There were a number of problems with the
policy. First, the already overstretched Africans had
neither the resources nor the willingness to pay for
the grain. Second, the Africans felt that since they
were paying tax (hut tax) to the government, the
government had an obligation to feed them since
they did not see any reason for paying the tax in the
first place.
In 1922, the country experienced another fam-
ine, the impact of which was far different from all
the previous famines. There were country-wide
food shortages, yet the country had enough grain
stocks to feed the entire nation—and even to export.
This was the first sign of the impact of the alien
economic system introduced by the Europeans.
Cattle prices had gone down, weakening the pur-
chasing power of the African population. Worse
still, the traditional famine-coping mechanisms of
the Africans had been weakened because much of
their traditional land had been usurped. Even where
wild food was still obtainable, the practice of wage
labor contrasted with the traditional hunting and
foraging strategies that for years Africans had found
most dependable.
Policy Shift
Famine policy shifted in 1922, when
the colonial government for the first
time introduced public works where those employed
were paid in food. This policy was introduced partly
because private employers could no longer provide
employment to all those who needed it and partly
because the need for public infrastructure like roads
in the rural areas became more apparent  during that
time.
The 1930s saw a major shift in African average
food production levels since the 1890s, with the rate
of increase in average yearly production falling
from the previous decade’s 3.8% to 2.06%. For the
first time, African food production declined steadily.
Food scarcity became permanent for the poor while
the wealthy always had food. This scenario was
particularly disastrous given that the African popu-
lation was growing fast and at the same time was
being driven to more arid regions of the country.
The Africans now heavily depended on grain from
the grain marketing boards because many could not
produce enough for themselves.
The Country’s Segmentation and
Land Pressure
By 1943, according to R.W.M.
Johnson (Johnson, 1964), 13.2 million hectares (ha)
had been settled by whites, 6.4 million ha were set
aside for future white occupation, 0.4 million ha
were forest reserves, and 7.2 million ha had not
been allocated to either race. This arrangement left
Africans with a mere 11.7 million ha. The pressure
on the African reserves was particularly acute after
World War II as the colonial authority began a
deliberate and systematic removal of “unwanted
Africans” from white land.
Before 1980, the country had two systems of
agriculture: commercial, which was highly sophis-
ticated and mainly the domain of the white commu-
nity, and peasant, which was largely neglected and
totally black. The peasant sector, which was then
called the Tribal Trust Lands, constituted 41.8% of
the total land mass of the country. The commercial
sector amounted to 42.7%, and the state held the
balance in the form of game parks, forests, and so
on. The commercial sector occupied the best agri-
culturally productive parts of the country, while the
peasant sector languished in generally poor agricul-
tural land.
Maize and Cotton Revolution
Despite the condition of agricultural
land in the communal sector, grain
production experienced a phenomenal growth after
independence in 1980. This was mainly due to
favorable agricultural policies adopted by the new
government, which provided incentives for the de-
velopment of communal agriculture. The commu-
nal farmers increased their maize production level
by marketed output by more than 50% compared to
the pre-colonial period. In 1985, for the first time
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since the early 1900s, communal farmers marketed
more maize and cotton than their commercial coun-
terparts.
Despite the growth in communal food produc-
tion in the communal areas, the problems of food
security and malnutrition persist. The droughts of
the 1980s and the famous one of 1992 found many
ill-prepared (if at all) for the inevitable food short-
ages, despite the mini-agricultural revolution of the
previous years. Many communal farmers found
themselves literally government “dependents,” queu-
ing for the miserly handouts distributed through the
various government drought relief programs
The question of food security has generated a lot
of debate and discussion, not only in Zimbabwe but
in southern Africa as a whole. The Zimbabwean
government, faced with another drought in 1995,
sought ways of feeding needy people without nec-
essarily bearing the costs alone.
Disaster Declared
Zimbabwe’s president, Robert
Mugabe, declared a state of disaster as
a result of the severe drought affecting most parts of
the country. In an announcement published in the
Government Gazette of July 7, 1995, the president
said, “And whereas it appears to me that the said
disaster is of such a nature and extent that extraordi-
nary measures are necessary to assist and protect the
people of Zimbabwe residing in communal, re-
settlement and small scale farming areas which are
affected, or the circumstances are likely to arise
making such measures necessary; now therefore, I
hereby declare that, with effect from the 28th July
1995, a state of disaster exists in the communal,
resettlement and small-scale farming areas of Zim-
babwe.”
The declaration of a disaster obligates the gov-
ernment to provide relief services to people in need.
The Zimbabwean government announced three
forms of disaster relief: the Grain Loan Scheme
(GLS), which is estimated to benefit some 5.05
million Zimbabweans; the Free Food Programme
(FFP), which is estimated to benefit about 733,000
people; and the Supplementary  Feeding Programme
(SFP), which is estimated to benefit more than
800,000 children.
Under the GLS, the government will loan grain
to those in need. This scheme is designed for the
able-bodied. The grain would be paid for in the
form of cash or grain after the next harvest. The
biggest impediment to the success of this program is
that it assumes the next harvest will be normal. The
FFP, which caters to the incapacitated, was in exist-
ence even during colonial  times. The SFP, which is
being run by the Ministry of Health, provides food
to targeted children under five years, but now feeds
even older school children when there is need.
Although these schemes are noble, the question
of sustainability still remains, as the government of
Zimbabwe, like most governments in southern Af-
rica, does not have the material and financial re-
sources to implement these programs. Food insecu-
rity will still be a problem if the fundamental ques-
tions of poverty, agricultural and land policies,
drought preparedness, and the whole area of disas-
ter management are not fully addressed. This is
particularly so because communal people, or the
poor in general, are always affected by drought
despite bumper harvests in previous years.
Information
For years, the Southern African re-
gion has been hit by droughts of vary-
ing magnitudes and durations. A lot has been writ-
ten about these droughts. Information on droughts
is stored in government archives, humanitarian or-
ganizations’ offices and libraries, and research in-
stitutions. The circulation of such information has
hitherto been limited to a “select” group of persons
or organizations. There have been few (if any)
regional information sharing mechanisms through
which documentation on drought and drought man-
agement could be channeled. Even at the national
level, people in drought management, though many
in number, often operated individually, without
sharing their experiences.
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It was not until March 1995 that the Interna-
tional Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies, along with the Southern African Re-
search and Documentation Centre (SARDC),
launched the Disaster Management Information
Project (DMIP). The Project’s primary purpose is
to improve the availability, accessibility, and dis-
semination of drought-related information, as well
as information on other disasters. The Project fo-
cuses on the 12 Southern African Development
Community states.
Joshua Chigodora
India Musokotwane Environment Resource
Centre for Southern Africa (IMERCSA)
15 Downie Avenue, Belgravia
P.O. Box 5690, Harare,
Zimbabwe
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